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How much of the decline in unemployment is due to the  
exhaustion of unemployment benefits?
by Luojia Hu, senior economist, and Shani Schechter, associate economist
Prior studies have examined the impact of extended unemployment insurance (UI) benefits 
on the rise in the unemployment rate in this recession and early recovery. We use real-time 
microdata from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey (CPS) to examine 
whether there has been a reverse effect recently as benefits have been exhausted. We find 
that if UI benefits had lasted indefinitely, the unemployment rate would have been cumulatively 
about 0.1 to 0.3 percentage points higher between October 2009 and January 2011, which 
represents about 10% to 25% of the decline in the actual rate over that period.  
During the most recent recession, the 
unemployment rate—especially the 
long-term unemploy-
ment rate1—rose to 
historical highs. After 
a surge following the 
financial crisis in fall 
2008, the unemploy-
ment rate peaked at 
10.1% one year later in 
October 2009. During 








UI benefits substantially 
beyond the normal 
limit of 26 weeks, with 
eligible individuals in 
some states able to  
receive as many as 99 
weeks of unemploy-
ment compensation. 
Extending UI benefits could raise the 
unemployment rate in two ways. First, it 
might create a disincentive in job search 
efforts, leading to a lower job-finding 
probability. Second, in order to qualify 
for the benefits, unemployed individuals 
might have a higher incentive to stay 
unemployed rather than leave the labor 
force. Both lead to a lower probability 
of exiting unemployment, longer average 
unemployment duration, and thus a 
higher unemployment rate.2 Indeed, 
several recent economic studies have 
found that UI extensions can account 
for 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points of the 
increase in the unemployment rate 
during the most recent recession and 
early recovery.3 
As of March 2011, the unemployment 
rate had declined to 8.8%. Furthermore, 
most of the people who entered unem-
ployment two years ago have by now likely 
reached the limit of their UI benefits. 
If the UI extensions contributed to the 
rise in the unemployment rate in this 
recession and early recovery, will the 
opposite now also be true? Are exhaus-
tions of UI benefits now contributing to 
the decline in the unemployment rate? 
In this Chicago Fed Letter, we study the 
evolution of UI benefit extensions and 
the effect of their depletion on the 
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1. Maximum potential weeks of UI benefits
Source: Data from U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, 
EB and EUC Trigger notices, available at http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/
unemploy/claims_arch.asp.

































Oct. Oct. Oct. Jul. Jul. Apr. Apr.unemployment rate, in real time, between 
October 2009 and January 2011. To 
estimate this effect, we identify the UI 
benefit “exhausters” and predict what they 
would have done had they not exhausted 
their benefits. This analysis is complicated 
by the fact that maximum potential UI 
benefits weeks are state- and time-specific 
and that we do not actually observe what 
“exhausters” would have done. 
Measuring exhaustions 
First, we compile a database of maximum 
potential benefit weeks. Due to a multi-
tier benefit system that relies on national- 
and state-level labor market triggers, as 
well as some differences in laws across 
states (e.g., which EB triggers will be rec-
ognized), there has been considerable 
variation by state and over time in the 
number of maximum weeks of UI ben-
efits individuals could receive.4 Figure 1 
shows this heterogeneity explicitly by 
plotting the fraction of states, plus 
Washington, DC, with a given level of 
maximum potential benefit weeks over 
time. The variation began in September–
November 2008 with the triggering of 
EB and introduction of the EUC tier 
system, and potential weeks peaked in 
November 2009 with the addition of 
two more tiers to EUC and continued 
worsening of the labor market. 
We then use reports 
of unemployment 
duration from the 
CPS, available through 
January 2011, to iden-
tify when individuals 
reached their state-
specific maximum. 
Those reaching their 
state’s maximum in 
any given month are 
henceforth known as 
“exhausters.” Explicitly, 
we define “exhausters” 
as individuals report-
ing an unemployment 
duration that is within 
a five-week interval 
containing the state 
limit (e.g., an individ-
ual reporting 57 weeks 
unemployment and 
living in a state where 
the maximum at that 
time was 59 weeks is an “exhauster,” since 
both values are in the 55- to 59-week 
range).5 Figure 2 reveals a baseline 
period of “exhaustions” as people hit the 
regular benefits maximum (26 weeks), 
a subsequent decline in November 2008 
when second-tier EUC extensions began, 
followed by a year of almost steadily in-
creasing exhaustions6 after the additional 
legislation in November 2009.7
Effects of exhaustions
To assess whether exhausting one’s UI 
benefits has an effect on one’s labor mar-
ket status, we track individuals over time8 
and look at the fractions of exhausters 
transitioning in the next period to em-
ployment (this is the unemployment to 
employment rate, or UE, for exhausters), 
out of the labor force (UO), and to con-
tinued unemployment (UU). Since 
changes in these rates might merely 
reflect changing economic conditions 
rather than responses to UI policy, we 
compare exhausters’ transitions with 
those of unemployed individuals who 
have not yet exhausted their benefits (a 
control group). However, people with 
much shorter unemployment spells may 
generally differ from exhausters in many 
other observed and unobserved traits 
that could also affect their transition rates. 
To deal with this problem, we explore 
the “discontinuity” around the UI ben-
efits time limit and focus on exhausters 
relative to a group of “nonexhausters” 
who also have relatively long unemploy-
ment spells but are just short of reaching 
their state’s limit.9 The idea is that the 
two groups would likely behave similarly 
had there been no limit on UI benefits. 
We argue that any differences between 
these two groups’ transitions into employ-
ment and out of the labor force are thus 
more likely to be due to the effects of UI.
Figure 3 presents the transition rates of 
UU, UE, and UO for exhausters and 
nonexhausters over the last three years. 
Panel A shows that from 2008 onward, 
nonexhausters became increasingly likely 
to stay unemployed (UU rate rose from 
approximately 60% to 80%). In contrast, 
the corresponding UU probability for 
exhausters also increased at first, but in 
mid-2009 it started falling to its early 2008 
level. Panels B and C indicate that this 
visible split between the two groups’ ten-
dencies to leave unemployment, especially 
from September to December 2010, is 
not so much due to exhausters being 
more likely to find a job (UE rates did 
not differ much) but due to exhausters’ 
higher likelihood of leaving the labor 
force (UO rates averaged 16 percentage 
points higher in the four-month period).10
Counterfactual unemployment rate
With information on both the number 
of exhausters and the differences in tran-
sition rates, we can find out what the 
unemployment rate would have been 
(“the counterfactual”) if UI benefits were 
indefinite and nobody had exhausted 
their benefits, so that exhausters, too, 
exhibited the transition rates of non-
exhausters.11 We find that between 
October 2009 and January 2011, the ex-
haustion of UI benefits can explain a 
cumulative change of 0.28 percentage 
points in the unemployment rate, which 
means that the headline January unem-
ployment rate, 9.0%, would have been 
9.3% without the effect of UI exhaustions. 
Our estimates might be biased upward for 
various reasons. In particular, we might 
have classified too many people as ex-
hausters because of heaping (rounding) 
in the unemployment duration responses 
at 104 weeks.12 To partly offset this, we 
2. Number of exhausters
Note: Counts are seasonally adjusted. 
SourceS: Authors’ calculations based on data from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Current Population Survey, basic monthly files, and U.S. Department of Labor, 

















CPS count of “exhausters,” based on sampling weights and 
state-time-varying UI benefit week maximums, not accounting 
for the recipiency rate.
Jul. Jul. Jul. Jul.derived an alternative estimate, applying 
a lower recipiency adjustment factor13 
to the CPS count of exhausters. We also 
applied the Department of Labor’s 
Employment and Training Administration 
data on final payments of EB as another 
alternative for the count of exhausters, 
since typically EB benefits are paid out 
after all regular and four tiers of EUC 
benefits have been exhausted. The result-
ing estimates of the cumulative change 
in the unemployment rate were re-
duced to 0.2 and 0.1 percentage points, 
respectively, with the latter likely being 
a lower bound.14
Conclusion
In this article, we were able to use real-
time CPS microdata on people counts and 
labor market transitions, rather than a set 
of strong assumptions (e.g., assuming all 
exhausters leave the labor force or using 
historical averages of transition rates for 
all unemployed) to estimate the magni-
tude of the change in the unemployment 
rate resulting from UI exhaustions. Our 
main findings are as follows. 1) The 
number of people hitting their state’s 
maximum UI benefits weeks rose sharply 
after November 2009. 2) While, on aver-
age, the job-finding probabilities are 
similar between exhausters and nonex-
hausters, exhausters appear to be more 
likely to leave the labor force. 3) If UI 
benefits had been extended indefinitely 
and exhausters had thus behaved like 
nonexhausters, the unemployment rate 
would have been cumulatively 0.1 to 
0.3 percentage points higher between 
October 2009 and January 2011, repre-
senting about 10% to 25% of the decline 
in the actual unemployment rate over 
the same period. 
Overall, our estimates suggest that UI 
exhaustions contributed modestly to the 
decline in the unemployment rate be-
tween October 2009 and January 2011. 
Our alternative unemployment rate path 
(not shown here) indicates that the effect 
of UI exhaustions was largest between 
September 2010 and December 2010.15 
If there is no further change in the cur-
rent programs, the same analysis would 
indicate that UI exhaustions will have a 
limited and diminishing effect on the 
unemployment rate in coming months.16 
However, if as labor market conditions 
improve in the coming years, the UI pro-
grams return to normal (no EUC or EB), 
we would expect to see bigger effects on 
the unemployment rate (as many recently 
unemployed hit the 26-week limit). Thus, 
the cumulative effect of UI exhaustions 
on the decline of the unemployment 
rate since late 2009 could be larger than 
0.3 percentage points and would thus 
gradually reverse the effect of UI exten-
sions on the rise in the unemployment 
rate, estimated in prior studies to be in 
the neighborhood of 1 percentage point.
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3. Labor market transition rates
percent
Note: Rates are seasonally adjusted, three-month moving averages.
SourceS: Authors’ calculations based on data from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, basic monthly 






















































A. Unemployment to unemployment (UU) B. Unemployment to employment (UE)
C. Unemployment to out-of-labor-force (UO)
1 The long-term unemployment rate is the 
share of the labor force unemployed more 
than 26 weeks.
2 Nevertheless, extended benefits can be 
welfare enhancing for many with low savings 
by reducing their need to take low-paying 
jobs that do not match well with their skills. 
See Raj Chetty, 2008, “Moral hazard versus 
liquidity constraint and optimal unemploy-
ment insurance,” Journal of Political Economy, 
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